Discussing Digital Rights Management (DRM) in the comments of a previous post, I started thinking about information, knowledge, and intellectual property. The distinctions between the three are very important in our digital age, and I wanted to define them for myselves. The point of doing so is to begin to develop a framework of thinking about digital media, property, and ownership in the post-iPod age.
While it may be more logical to start from the ground up before explaining my conclusions, I want to come out with full disclosure and say that my purpose in this is to argue in favor of DRM (at least in principle). My views stand in stark opposition to a loosely-defined set of ideas commonly found on various parts of the internet, notably on TechDirt.
Most succinctly, I take the view that information and knowledge are not the same.
Information
Information can most easily be understood as ‘raw’ data: a set of instructions, patterns, or numbers that exist outside of human interaction. A digital file, program, or the words printed in a book constitute information. Information can be utilized by machines to engage in automated processes, such as displaying an image or moving a robot. In a somewhat similar manner, humans can interpret information and process it in various ways. However, in order for that information to enter human consciousness and effect or be effected by that human, it must first be converted into knowledge.
Knowledge
Knowledge is the psychological or cognitive experience of information. Unlike information interacting with a machine, our acquisition, interpretation, and use of knowledge is entirely dependent on the physiological structure of the brain as well as the knowledge we have accumulated in the past. My subjective experience of the statement 2 + 2 = 4, for example, depends on my recognition of each of the symbols involved, an understanding of syntax, and knowledge of basic arithmetic.
Each of these pieces (or rather, patterns) of knowledge is unique to me. Whereas two computers with the same hardware can fairly be said to understand such statements equally, my experience of the statement is fundamentally different than that of anyone else.
In far more complex operations, such as the interpretation of political events, interpersonal relationships, complex philosophical ideas, etc., the differences between the subjective experience of information (that is, ‘knowledge’) between any two people will grow. Even if our experiences of the color blue are more or less the same, our experience of Atlas Shrugged will be undoubtedly extremely different.
Intellectual Property
This difference is important in understanding the validity of DRM because it highlights what the restriction on the use of media is really about. While opponents of the DRM see such technologies as limiting the distribution of information, the methods for encryption actually allow content owners and creators to restrict the distribution of the products of the creators’ knowledge. As a practical and legal matter, this knowledge has been commodified as intellectual property.
In other words, DRM technologies are designed to control the use of distribution of intellectual property (commodified knowledge).
A common argument against DRM is rooted in the belief that the technologies rob consumers of ownership of information. This is a confusion that exists only because digital distribution has made the legal distinction between a license to experience intellectual property and the ownership of intellectual property obvious to the consumer in a way that was hidden before.
When intellectual property and tangible items were experienced in the same form–when information and intellectual property came in the form of a book, newspaper, or recording–the distinctions between licensee and owner were invisible. Because the consumer had purchased a physical item, most assumed that they ‘owned’ the knowledge contained therein (the ‘book’, ‘paper’, ‘album’). Yet that was never the case; ownership of the intellectual property was held by the creator (generally the individual, group, or entity responsible for the generation and expression of knowledge). Purchasing a CD was always an exchange of money for a license to experience its intellectual property in a private setting.
The necessity of physical storage acted as its own form of rights management. Because it was impractical (or impossible with high-fidelity) to duplicate and distribute physical objects (at least before the age of personal computers), no further action was needed to protect the rights of the content owner to license and distribute the music as she pleased.
DRM then, is not based on a new idea, and in no way does it change the fundamental relationship between rights owner and consumer. It is instead a new, more visible manifestation of an existing regime.
The Legitimacy of Commodifying Knowledge
Another argument that one could make against DRM is that simply because rights management has existed does not mean that it ought to exist. Such a ‘free information’ position argues that there ought to be no restriction on information of any type; that it should flow freely from and to whomever cares to access it. In its strong form, proponents have argued that commodifying information is immoral and may constitute limitations of freedom itself.
Yet if we believe that property rights are legitimate for tangible object, it is hard to argue that the same principle should not apply to intellectual property. Because intellectual property is knowledge, rather than information, its creation requires human effort in a way that is fundamentally the same as physical labor.
To reiterate, intellectual property is not merely information, it is a product of human labor; thus, ownership and control of knowledge is (in principle) entirely legitimate.
Practical Problems
Moving from theory to reality, it is obvious that DRM technologies in their current state can pose legitimate obstacles to consumers. For one, certain types of media are non-transferrable. If a consumer purchases a license to view a film, for instance, she should be allowed to view it on different devices. Many forms of DRM currently do not allow this: because allowing consumers to create standard digital copies of a DVD also allows them to control distribution of that intellectual property, many studios prefer to encode and encrypt such files?
But what about the consumer who just wants to view a film on her iPod? Until recently, she had been out of luck. Yet studios are beginning to include restricted digital copies of films with the purchase of a DVD, allowing the consumer to experience intellectual property in different forms.
The lesson here is that there is a difference between DRM in principle and technical limitations of existing forms of DRM. I do not mean to argue that DRM in its current state is perfect, simply that the ability to own and control intellectual property is as legitimate as the ownership of any private property. With advances in technology, the particular problems of any particular implementation of DRM can be minimized or avoided altogether.
Compulsion and Freedom
As a final note, I want to make it clear that both DRM and something like the GNU Public License can very easily coexist. The ability to control one’s intellectual property inherently requires the ability to relinquish that control. None of what I have argued should be construed to say that creators ought to utilize DRM in any of their works. I often use software under a Creative Commons license, and am willing to share most anything I create under the same. Yet I believe that it is absolutely vital to allow other creators to decide if they prefer to have ownership of the fruits of their intellectual labor for themselves.
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